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This thesis analyzes the Russian Federations conventional arms transfers since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia looks to the sale of conventional arms as 
a promising source of capital income and a viable method to maintain its state defense 
industry. Due to a substantial decrease in sales volume, the international conventional 
arms market has become extremely competitive over the last decade. This 
competitiveness has driven exporters, including Russia, to offer latest technologies 
employed in such advanced weapons as supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, acoustically 
quiet submarines, and fourth generation fighter aircraft.  The continued worldwide 
proliferation of advanced Russian conventional arms will remain a major concern for the 
United States Navy in the foreseeable future. 
Navies throughout the world, in particular Chinas Peoples Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN), are aggressively purchasing Russian advanced naval equipment and 
related technologies to improve their maritime capabilities. The United States Navy, 
accordingly, will increasingly encounter and possibly be engaged by advanced Russian 
conventional arms within the decade.  Initiatives which curtail proliferation and minimize 
the impact of these weapons on regional stability should be implemented, thereby, 
reducing the potential threat to forward-deployed naval forces.  The United States needs 
to strengthen current policies including the Wassenaar Arrangement arms control 
agreement, continue U.S.-Russian cooperative efforts in converting Russias defense 
industry, and maintain a viable naval presence in the Western Pacific to counter the 
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This thesis examines the status of the Russian Federations conventional arms 
transfers since 1991 and the implications these transfers may have on United States Navy 
operational forces. Russia looks to the sale of conventional arms as a promising source of 
capital income and a viable method to maintain its state defense industry. Due to a 
substantial decrease in sales volume, the international conventional arms market has 
become extremely competitive over the last decade. This competitiveness has driven 
exporters, including Russia, to offer latest technologies employed in such advanced 
weapons as supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, acoustically quiet submarines, and fourth 
generation fighter aircraft.  The continued worldwide proliferation of advanced Russian 
conventional arms will remain a major concern for the United States Navy in the 
foreseeable future. 
The thesis begins with a discussion of current worldwide trends in conventional 
arms transfers and addresses specifically the various military hardware and technologies 
the Russian Federation is presently exporting. Russias primary customers are then 
examined along with an analysis of current Russian conventional sales volumes. An in-
depth analysis of the Russian Federations defense industry since 1991 provides insight to 
the challenges confronting Russias defense industry as well as future prospects for the 
continued proliferation of Russian conventional arms throughout the world. 
 The thesis then employs a case study involving present-day Russian conventional 
arms transfers to China which serves as an example of a developing pattern of customer 
2 
relationships between Russia and numerous nations throughout the world. Since 1991, 
China has imported substantial volumes of Russian military equipment and technology, 
including naval equipment and technology. The case study analyzes the potential threat 
the export of Russian naval conventional arms imposes upon the worldwide, operational 
forces of the United States Navy. Specifically, possible threats to the U.S. Navy posed by 
Chinas Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) are examined.  
Although the present volume of Russian conventional arms transfers is a  fraction 
of previous arms levels exported by the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation currently 
ranks as the second largest supplier of major conventional weapons in the world.1  Russia 
amassed nearly $14.7 billion in sales of conventional weapons between 1995-1999. In 
comparison,  the United States was the only country that outsold the Russian Federation 
during this timeframe with sales of $53.4 billion.1  
State defense procurement orders for military equipment collapsed in Russia after 
the fall of the Soviet Union. The economic crises throughout the 1990s, and specifically 
the ruble crash in 1998, contributed to a severe lack of funding for the once powerful 
Russian defense industry. According to Dr. Aleksei Arbatov,  Vice Chairman of Russian 
Defense Committee, there is no solution on the immediate horizon  so defense contractors 
and planners should not expect significant domestic procurement to resume until 2005.2  
                                                 
1 In discussing the proliferation of conventional weapons, it is necessary at the outset to define what 
weapons constitute conventional weapons. For the focus of this thesis, the term conventional weapons 
includes warships/submarines, combat aircraft/helicopters, armored combat vehicles, battle tanks, 
missiles/missile launchers, and related technologies to said equipment. 
2 Blank, Stephen, Russias Clearance Sale, Janes Intelligence Review, November 1, 1997, p. 517. 
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The domestic economic problems experienced by the Russian Federation during 
the 1990s forced the Russians to re-examine their conventional arms transfer policies. 
Unlike the Cold War period, when political and ideological considerations heavily 
dictated Soviet conventional arms transfers, economic considerations have now become 
the driving force behind Russian conventional arms transfers. Challenges such as drastic 
economic reforms, substantial decreases in state defense procurements, the failure of 
defense conversion, and widespread bankruptcy have routinely confronted the Russian 
defense industry since 1991. The Russian defense industry, consequently, now views 
conventional arms exports as a means of survival and a primary source of reliable 
revenue. 
China, meanwhile, has been one of the Russian Federations largest consumers of 
conventional arms over the past decade and recently the two countries have entered into a 
strategic partnership with one another. In particular, China has  been purchasing large 
amounts of advanced naval conventional arms from Russia. Imports of Russian 
armaments such as Kilo-class submarines, Sovremennyy-class destroyers, SS-N-22 
Sunburn missiles,  and Mig-29, Su-27, Su-30, and Ka-28 aircraft dramatically boosted the 
maritime capabilities of Chinas PLAN forces. In the immediate future, China, as well as 
other nations, will continue to procure large amounts of advanced Russian naval 
equipment and technology to modernize their naval fleets. Accordingly, as the case study 
suggests, the United States Navy will increasingly encounter advanced Russian naval 
equipment throughout the worlds oceans. 
4 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is based on primary and secondary open sources addressing current 
worldwide trends in conventional arms transfers, Russias conventional arms exports 
since 1991, the primary importers of Russian conventional arms, and the status of the 
Russian Federations defense industry.  A case study is then provided which exemplifies 
the pattern of customer relationships Russia employs with its customers. Included in the 
case study is a discussion of the specific armaments China has imported from Russia to 
enhance the maritime capabilities of the PLAN and the implications these transfers have 
on operational forces of the United States Navy. 
 
C.  ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II discusses trends of present worldwide arms transfers, including the 
historical context, leading exporting/importing countries and current worldwide volumes 
of conventional arms transfers. Further, an overview of Russias conventional arms 
transfer policies, current customers which actively purchase Russian advanced 
conventional arms, and  projections of Russian conventional arms transfers are addressed. 
  Chapter III examines the Russian Federations defense industry since 1991. 
Decline in state defense procurement orders and failure of defense conversion posed 
serious challenges to the Russian defense industry over the past decade. As a result, 
Russian initiatives including consolidation of the defense industry under President Putin 
and a newfound reliance on the export of Russian conventional arms are presently 
5 
underway to meet these challenges and salvage the once preeminent Russian defense 
industry.  
Chapter IV focuses on a case study involving Sino-Russian arms agreements 
since 1991 and the strategic partnership which has recently emerged between the two 
countries. Specifically, China has purchased large volumes of Russian naval equipment 
and technologies and this case study explores the challenges these Russian weapon 
systems may pose for U.S. Naval forces operating in the Western Pacific. 
In summation, Chapter V offers conclusions regarding the status of Russian 
conventional arms transfers since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implications 
associated with such transfers. United States policy recommendations are then offered to 
effectively address the ever-increasing proliferation of advanced Russian conventional 
arms throughout the world. In light of the continuing transfers of advanced Russian 
conventional arms, the United States needs to strengthen current policies including the 
Wassenaar Arrangement arms control agreement, continue U.S.-Russian cooperative 
efforts in converting Russias defense industry, and maintain a viable naval presence in 






























II. CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS SINCE 1991 
It is clear that the worldwide conventional arms market is: first, 
significantly smaller than before; second, unlikely to regain the high sales 
volume of the mid-1980s; and third, still large enough to encourage 
traditional arms producers to emphasize exports.3 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the present status of worldwide 
conventional arms sales and, specifically, the present status of the Russian Federations 
conventional arms transfers. This analysis highlights the recent decline in worldwide 
arms transfers and discusses the implications of the ever-increasing competitiveness of 
todays conventional arms market. Leading importing and exporting countries, including 
Russia, are examined as well as geographic areas targeted by conventional arms 
exporting nations. This chapter argues that, despite the overall decline in conventional 
arms transfers, the current proliferation of Russian conventional weapons continues on a 
grand scale. The Russian Federation still ranks second to the United States in worldwide 
conventional weapons sales.4  The proliferation of modern and lethal Russian 
conventional arms will continue in the immediate future and may pose serious threats to 
operational forces of the United States Navy. 
 
                                                 
3 Hull, Andrew and Markov, David. A Changing Market in the Arms Bazaar, Janes Intelligence 
Review, March 1, 1997, p.143. 
4 SIPRI Yearbook 2000, p. 372. 
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A. PRESENT TRENDS OF WORLDWIDE ARMS TRANSFERS 
The worldwide market for conventional weapons has diminished in terms of 
volume since the end of the Cold War, resulting in a fiercely competitive arms market as 
we enter the 21st century. The conventional arms market once dominated and controlled 
by the United States (U.S.) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (U.S.S.R.) has 
subsequently been transformed into an arms market with numerous participants who are 
willing to sell and purchase advanced conventional arms.  While few believe the extreme 
volume of weapon sales reached during the Cold War has any chance of reappearing in 
the near future, the proliferation of more advanced conventional weapons continues on a 
routine basis by developed and developing nations.  
Overcapacity, intense competition, and a buyers market are the three primary 
factors effecting the recent decline in the global arms market.5 First, the drastic 
international defense buildup of the 1980s resulted in the overcapacity of many 
industrial nations, and, now, the world is awash in excess weapons and defense 
production capabilities.6 Second, the United States, the Soviet Union, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) members, China, Israel, and South Korea are no longer the 
only major participants in global arms sales. Traditional arms exporters have recently 
been encountering new competition from developing producers such as India, Taiwan, 
                                                 
5 OPrey, Kevin P., The Arms Export Challenge: Cooperative Approaches to Export Management and 
Defense Conversion (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p.8-9. 
6 Ibid., p.8. 
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Brazil, and North Korea.7 Third, the aforementioned points have contributed to the 
establishment of a buyers market within the international arms arena. Importing 
countries now possess greater freedom and selectivity than in the past and prospective 
arms importers have become much more demanding in terms of the top-of-the-line 
equipment, co-production agreements, countertrade requirements, and after-sales 
service.8  
 
1. The Changing Nature of Conventional Arms Transfers 
The nature of international arms sales has dramatically changed since 1991. The 
past decade has witnessed economic interests superceding political/ideological interests 
as the driving force behind the continued worldwide proliferation of conventional 
weapons. Unlike the conventional arms market of the Cold War in which countries often 
purchased conventional arms on credit due to their political/ideological alignment with 
the supplier, todays arms purchasers need readily available funds to procure 
conventional weapons. Presently, if a nation has the financial resources to purchase arms, 
there are many nations willing to sell to them, regardless of ideological/political 
persuasion or military implications. 
National defense budgets throughout the world have  substantially decreased and 
domestic defense procurements, consequently, have accordingly diminished. As of 1997, 
U.S. defense procurement declined 71 percent from its 1985 Cold War procurement 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
 8 Ibid.,p.9. 
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levels, and Russian defense procurement declined by 80 percent since 1990.9 To revive 
Russias defense industry in this fiscal environment, defense enterprises have 
aggressively sought both old and new customers in the worldwide arms market (see 
Chapter III). Increasingly, governments and defense industries are turning to the 
international arms market for salvation. Indeed, (conventional arms) exports now equate 
to survival for many (defense) firms.10 
Soviet decisions regarding conventional arms exports were dictated by whether 
the importing country maintained a socialist orientation and/or reflected a counterbalance 
to U.S. influence in the region.11 During the past decade, however, policy-makers in the 
leading supplier countries (including Russia) have faced the problem of preserving 
defense industries in a time of shrinking foreign and domestic demand.12 The aftermath 
of the Cold War found the political considerations waning in deference to economic 
considerations. Russia, in particular, aggressively sought new markets throughout the 
world for economic gain, including NATO members such as Greece and Turkey.  
2. Current Volume of Conventional Arms Transfers 
The current volume of international conventional arms sales is a fraction of what 
it was during the Cold War. At the height of the Cold War, the overall volume for 
                                                 
9 Andrew Hull and David Markov, p.140.  
10 Ibid., p.141. 
11 Anthony, Ian. Russia and the Arms Trade, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 40. 
12 Mussington, David. Understanding Contemporary International Arms Transfers, Adelphi Paper 
291(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 11. 
11 
international conventional arms sales reached an estimated $71 billion in 1985.13 In 
contrast, the volume of 1999 worldwide conventional sales amounted to less than half 
this amount with international conventional arms sales to both developed and developing 
nations peaking at just over $30 billion.14 As presented in Figure 2.1, the dollar amount 
of conventional arms transfers during the first half of the 1990s gradually decreased in 
the aftermath of both the fall of the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf War. This 
universal decrease continued primarily through the mid-1990s, but rebounded slightly 
since 1997 due to improving worldwide economic conditions.  
 
3. Leading Importing/Exporting Countries 
Due to a substantial decrease in sales volume, the international conventional arms 
market has become extremely competitive over the last decade. This competitiveness has 
driven exporters to offer latest technologies employed in such advanced weapons as 
supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, acoustically quiet submarines, and fourth generation  
                                                 
13 Andrew Hull and David Markov, p. 142. 
14 Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1992-1999, CRS Report RL 30640 
(Congressional Research Service, August 18, 2000), p. 2. Developing nations include all countries except 






































Figure 2.1: Worldwide Arms Transfer Agreements 
From: CRS Report RL 30640 
 
fighter aircraft. As the 21st century begins, five countries dominate the international arms 
export market. The United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany 
have been the top five worldwide suppliers of major conventional weapons to both 
developed and developing countries from 1995-1999.15 The United States has amassed 
$53.4 billion, Russia $14.6 billion, France $11.7 billion, the United Kingdom $7.3 
billion, and Germany has earned $6.1 billion in conventional weapon sales over the  past 
five years (see Table 2.2).16  In terms of actual arms transfer agreements, the United 
States currently accounts for over 39 percent of worldwide arms transfers followed by the 
                                                 
15 SIPRI Yearbook 2000, p. 372.  
16 Ibid.,p.372. 
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Russian Federation at nearly 20 percent.17 Conventional weapons such as the F-16 C/D 
fighter aircraft, M1A1 Abrams tank, Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, and Kilo-class and 
Type 209 submarines represent more sought after conventional weapons the last several 
years.18  
 
Rank Supplier Value of Deliveries, 
1995-1999 
1 USA $53.4 billion 
2 Russia $14.6 billion 
3 France $11.7 billion 
4 UK $7.3 billion 
5 Germany $6.1 billion 
6 Netherlands $2.24 billion 
7 China $2.21 billion 
8 Ukraine $2.1 billion 
9 Italy $2 billion 
10 Canada $1.1 billion 
 
Table 2.2: The Leading Suppliers of Major Conventional Weapons, 1995-1999: 
(Expressed in constant 1990 U.S. dollars) 
                        From: SIPRI Yearbook 2000, Appendix 7A.2. 
 
Developing nations have been the principal importers of conventional weapons 
since 1991 (see Figure 2.1). Conventional arms exporters have placed emphasis on Asia, 
Europe, and the Middle East and these three regions currently constitute the majority of 
the worlds conventional weapons recipients. Specifically, as depicted in Table 2.3, 
                                                 
17 CRS Report RL 30640, p. 6. 
18 Ibid., pp. 6-9. 
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Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey were the top three conventional arms importers from 
1995-1999.19   
A contributing factor in the sale of conventional arms within these regions has 
been the domino effect. The domino effect occurs when the sale of several dozen 
weapon systems creates a new market in a neighboring country in response.20 Over the 
past decade, consequently, the domino effect increased the number of countries seeking 
advanced conventional arms from conventional weapons exporters. 
Asia has become the number one conventional arms market recipient in the world 
due primarily to the domino effect. Several East Asian nations, for example, have 
responded to growing Chinese military strength (modernization) by buying advanced 
Western and Russian military equipment.21 Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan are just a 
sampling of East Asian countries which have increased conventional arms imports due to 
Chinas Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) modernization program. From 1995-1999, in 
fact, China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan have accounted for approximately 26 
percent of worldwide major conventional weapons deliveries with a total value over $28 
billion.22  
Additionally, the European market has been a major recipient of conventional 
arms over the past decade. Although many European countries have sizeable defense 
                                                 
19 SIPRI Yearbook 2000, p. 368. 
20 Andrew Hull and David Markov, p. 142. 
21 Ibid. 
22 SIPRI Yearbook 2000, pp.368-371. 
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industries, many have not been able to effectively meet production requirements for 
specific types of advanced defense equipment such as cruise missiles and attack 
helicopters.23 France and the United Kingdom, for instance, have turned to the United 
States for off-the-shelf purchases as solutions to some of their military requirements.24  
The Middle East has always been an important geographic area for conventional 
arms transfers. Continuous tensions in the region over the past few decades, i.e. the Arab-
Israeli Wars and the Iran-Iraq War, have consistently provided a prime market for 
conventional arms sellers. The coalition forces powerful weapons display during Desert 
Storm also contributed to the recent high demand for more advanced conventional arms 
in many Middle Eastern countries. As Table 2.3 depicts, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United 
Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), and Israel have been the primary recipients of conventional arms 






                                                 
 
23 Anthony, Ian, p.23. As examples, the UK bought the US BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missile, the 
UK and the Netherlands purchased the US AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, and the UK and France bought 
US E-3 AWACS systems. 
24 Ibid. 
25  SIPRI Yearbook 2000, p.368.  
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Rank Recipient Value of Deliveries, 
1995-1999 
1 Taiwan $13.9 billion 
2 Saudi Arabia $9.2 billion 
3 Turkey $6.5 billion 
4 South Korea $6 billion 
5 Egypt $4.7 billion 
6 India $4.6 billion 
7 Japan $4.3 billion 
8 Greece $4.1 billion 
9 China $4 billion 
10 U.A.E. $3.3 billion 
 
Table 2.3: The Leading Recipients of Major Conventional Weapons, 1995-1999: 
(Expressed in constant 1990 U.S. dollars) 
                      From: SIPRI Yearbook 2000, Appendix 7A.1. 
B. CURRENT RUSSIAN CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS 
Because Russia has a wide variety of weaponry to sell, from the most 
basic to the highly sophisticated, and despite the internal problems in the 
Russian defense industrial sector, various developing countries still view 
Russia as a potential source of their military equipment.26 
 
 In December 1991, the dissolution of the Soviet Union precipitated an end to the  
extraordinary levels of conventional weapon sales attained by the U.S.S.R. during the 
1980s. The Russian Federation inherited the largest part of the Soviet Unions defense 
industrial base at this time, and, due to decreasing world demand, had to reduce 
expectations regarding the profitability of conventional arms transfers.27 It is crucial to 
                                                 
 26 CRS Report RL30640, p.7. 
27 Ian Anthony, p. 28. 
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remember that Russia is currently the second most profitable arms exporter behind the 
United States, and thus, Russian advanced conventional arms based on modern 1980s 
and 90s technologies remain widely available for purchase in 2001. 
 
1. Current Volume and Types of Russian Conventional Arms Transfers 
During the mid to late 1980s, the Soviet Unions defense industry experienced its 
most profitable years through large scale exports of conventional arms. On a yearly basis 
the Soviet Union exported between $15 and $20 billion of conventional weapons 
primarily through the granting of credit and/or barter arrangements with many of its 
customers.28 Once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, however, exports of conventional 
weapons by the Russian Federation likewise collapsed. With the Russian defense industry 
in a rapid state of decline, the Russians could no longer afford to export conventional 
arms without receiving compensation. 
While conventional arms exports dropped significantly to an average of 
approximately $3 billion per year over the past decade, Russia continued to aggressively 
market advanced conventional arms throughout the world (see Figure 2.4).29 In 1999, for 
example, Russian exports of conventional arms amounted to $3.125 billion. In some 
years during the 1990s, Russian conventional exports did not reach the $3 billion level. 
Domestic economic problems in 1998, including the ruble crash, devastated the Russian 
                                                 
28 Ibid., p.75. 
29 SIPRI Yearbook 2000, p. 372. 
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economy and as a result, conventional weapons exports only amounted to $1.752 billion 






























1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
 
Figure 2.4: Soviet/Russian Arms Exports Since 1990 
From: SIPRI Yearbooks 1995-2000. 
 
 Even to maintain the multi-billion dollar sales volumes described above, the 
Russian Federation must export vast quantities and varieties of advanced conventional 
arms. The majority of Soviet arms for sale during the Cold War were not leading edge 
weapons and were designed and produced during the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. The 
conventional arms currently sold by the Russian Federation, however, are highly 
advanced, much more sophisticated weapons based on newer 1980s and 90s 
technologies. Soviet/Russian weaponry has been sought for many years by importing 
countries searching for advanced air force, air defense, and naval equipment at reasonable 




prices. Todays Russian product line seeks to accomodate these importing countries with 
equipment such as Su-27, Su-30, Mig-29, Mig-31, Mi-17, and Ka-27 aircraft, S-300 (SA-
10) air defense regiments, Kilo-class submarines, Krivak-class frigates, Sovremenny-
class destroyers, SS-N-22 Sunburn and Kh-35 Uran missiles, and T-90 battle tanks.31 
In 1999, air force weapons and equipment accounted for over 50 percent of Russian arms 
exports, air defense weapons accounted for 14 percent , and  naval equipment accounted 
for 13 percent.32 The implications of such weapons proliferation cannot be ignored as we 
enter the 21st century. 
Three state-run organizations consistently led the Russian Federation in total 
conventional arms sales during the latter half of the 1990s. Rosvooruzheniye sold new 
Russian conventional weapons, Promexport sold spare Russian parts and used equipment, 
and Rossiyskiye Tekhnologii was responsible for selling production licenses and 
technology transfers. 33 Rosvooruzheniye was, and continues to be, the leader of the three 
companies in terms of profitability. Rosvooruzheniye was responsible for 80 percent of 
Russian conventional arms sales in 1999.34 Due to the continued success of 
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Rosvooruzheniye, many defense analysts suggest total volume of Russian arms exports 
could increase to $4.5 billion in 2000.35 
2. Importers of Russian Conventional Arms 
Russian advanced conventional arms continue to be aggressively marketed to 
nations throughout the world. The Russian Federations current conventional weapons 
client base involves a mixture of both former and post-Soviet Union customers such as 
India and Turkey, respectively.  As was true during the Soviet era, countries continue to 
be drawn towards the reliability, operating simplicity, and low-price of Russian 
conventional arms.36 
China and India have been the two prominent purchasers of Russian conventional 
arms since the fall of the Soviet Union. A detailed case study involving Chinese imports 
of Russian weaponry is offered in Chapter IV, but, in general, China has aggressively 
bought Russian advanced conventional weapons over the past several years to include 
Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, S-300 (SA-10) air defense missiles, Kilo-class 
submarines, Sovremenny-class destroyers, SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles, and 
KA-27 anti-submarine helicopters.37 The potential threat these purchases pose towards 
U.S. Naval forces will continue to increase over the next several years (see Chapter IV). 
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India, similarly, continues as one of Russias most dependable conventional 
weapons customers. Over the past four decades, Russia has supplied about $30 billion 
worth of weapons to India, much of which is still in use and needs a steady supply of 
spares to run.38 Approximately 60 percent of Indias weapon systems are supplied by 
the Russian Federation, so Russian product support plays a crucial role in maintaining 
Indias defense hardware.39 Recent arms purchases by India include Kilo-class 
submarines, Krivak III frigates, T-90 tanks, Su-30 fighter aircraft, and the Admiral 
Gorshkov aircraft carrier.40 Because India is satisfied with both the quality of arms and 
support infrastructure they  receive from the Russian Federation,  India will continue to 
be a prominent Russian arms customer in the foreseeable future.  
In addition to large volume importers such as China and India, the Russian 
Federation also has numerous customers who purchase less significant quantities of 
conventional arms. Iran, Syria, Algeria, Libya, Serbia, Greece, Turkey, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Singapore, North Korea, South Korea, and Colombia are a few of the countries 
who currently purchase Russian advanced conventional arms.41 The Russians consider 
the world their marketplace, and, most recently, they have been aggressively pursuing 
non-traditional markets such as the NATO countries of Greece and Turkey.  Analysts, 
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however, correctly argue that many of Russias current arms sales are destabilizing and 
escalate ongoing regional arms races such as the Sino-Indian, North/South Korean, and 
Greek/Turkish rivalries.42 In the words of one Russian government official though, 
Russia is willing to sell anything that our customers want, except nuclear weapons.43 
Such statements exemplify why the United States remains concerned with the continued 
Russian proliferation of advanced conventional arms. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
Chapter II has provided an overview of present day international and Russian 
conventional arms sales. Although the conventional weapons market has decreased 
overall since the 1980s, billions of dollars continue to change hands in the worldwide 
arms market on a yearly basis. The Russian Federation still ranks as the number two 
exporter of conventional arms in the world and, unlike during the Cold War period, many 
of these weapons are highly advanced, lethal weapons incorporating modern 
technologies. The United States, therefore, must continue to closely monitor Russian 
conventional arms exports in the future to reduce the possible threat these weapons may 
pose towards U.S. Naval forces.  
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III. THE RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY SINCE 1991 
Arms sales are now critical to the Russian defense industry because the 
state cannot afford to procure weapons for its own forces. Exports remain 
essentially this industrys sole source of income. Although many defense 
firms have received subsidies of one sort or another, only if they export 
can they be sure of surviving.44 
 
This chapter examines the Russian Federations defense industry over the past 
decade and the challenges currently facing Russian defense enterprises. Contributing 
factors including the lack of government defense procurement orders and major problems 
inherent in defense conversion are addressed in detail. The chapter also addresses 
possible solutions being examined by Russian political and business leaders to restore the 
once powerful defense sector. These solutions include major restructuring of the defense 
industry under newly elected President Vladimir Putin as well as the Russian 
Federations newfound reliance on the international conventional arms market for 
survival. Specifically, Military-Technical Cooperation (MTC) has become a key focus for 
Russian defense enterprises over the past decade, and MTC may represent a solution to 
the overall defense industrys current challenges.  
 
A. PRESENT STATUS OF RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
Ten years have passed since the fall of the Soviet Union and the defense industry 
of the Russian Federation in 2001 bears little resemblance to the former preeminent 
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Soviet defense sector. During the Cold War, large state defense procurement orders for 
Soviet military equipment were consistently received by Soviet defense enterprises. The 
Soviet defense industry was the most privileged sector of the Soviet economy with the 
best Soviet resources and personnel routinely directed towards defense enterprises.  
 Within a few months after the fall of the Soviet Union, however, the once 
flourishing Soviet defense industry collapsed into disarray. State defense procurement 
orders ceased virtually overnight. This trend continued throughout the 1990s and to this 
day hinders the success of the Russian Federations defense industry. The Russian 
Federation rapidly discovered it could not economically support the enormous defense 
industry and looked towards defense conversion as a possible solution. The primary 
challenges currently facing defense conversion in Russia include the technical difficulty 
associated with the conversion process, a misguided governmental strategy, and the 
staunch opposition defense enterprise managers have towards conversion. 
1. Background of the Soviet Defense Industry  
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Unions massive defense industry 
remained the unrivaled leader in the Soviet economy. The Soviet defense sector was 
responsible for 60 percent of machine production and more than 80 percent of electronics 
manufacturing in the Soviet economy.45 Success within the Soviet defense industry 
equated to success for the overall economy of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet defense industry 
determined the level of scientific and technological advancement and the pace of 
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research and development for other sectors of the economy.46 Within the defense 
industry defense enterprises were provided with prime access to the finest material and 
human resources in the Soviet Union."47  
The Soviet defense sector clearly received more funding and preferential 
treatment in comparison to other non-defense industries within the Soviet Union. 
According to some estimates, the U.S.S.R. spent nearly 20 percent of its gross national 
product (GNP) within the defense sector.48 To maintain the immense infrastructure of the 
Soviet defense industry demanded such levels of funding. The nine branches of the 
Soviet defense industries, or devyatka, comprised between 2,000 and 4,000 production 
enterprises, research and development (R&D) facilities, and research institutes.49  
Equally astonishing was the number of Soviet citizens employed within the 
defense industry during the Cold War. During the late 1980s, between 9 million and 14 
million Soviet citizens worked within the defense establishment.50 The Russian 
Federation alone inherited a defense sector consisting of 1,200 purely military-oriented 
factories with a workforce of some 4 million.51 Out of all the former-Soviet states, the 
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Russian Federation clearly became responsible for the majority of defense enterprises 
comprising the former Soviet defense industry.  
Numerous Russian cities were almost entirely developed around defense 
enterprises and their workforce. In approximately 74 Russian cities 80 percent of the 
work force within these communities were dependent on the defense industry.52 The ten 
leading region/cities involved in the defense industry are depicted in Table 3.1. Clearly, 
the importance of Soviet defense enterprises to the overall success of the Soviet economy 
could not be overstated. 
President Boris Yeltsin, upon taking office, immediately instituted broad political  
reform within the Russian Federation. President Yeltsins chief economic reform 
strategist, Yegor Gaydar, attempted to transform the Russian economy from a Soviet-
style command economy into a capitalist, market economy.53 Gaydars shock therapy 
strategy never quite succeeded, however, and the Russian economy quickly collapsed in 
the early 1990s.54 Instead of fueling the Russian economy, the shock therapy approach 
led to widespread corruption within government and business circles resulting in the 
creation of a privileged Russian oligarchy.55 
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Region/City Defense Workforce 
(in thousands) 
Sverdlovsk 350 
St. Petersburg (city) 318 
Moscow (city) 300 
Nizhniy Novgorod 257 







Table 3.1: Number of Soviet Defense Industry Workers by Region/City 
From: OPrey, A Farewell to Arms?, p.22. Based on Julian Coopers The Soviet Defence 
Industry: Conversion and Economic Reform (New York: Council on Foreign Relations 
Press, 1991). 
 
2. Decrease in State Defense Procurement 
 The Russian defense sector, arguably, was the hardest hit by Yegor Gaydars 
sweeping economic reforms. The government slashed state orders for arms procurement 
by 68 percent with the aim of forcing most defense enterprises to find new work in the 
civil sector or liquidate.56 As a consequence, civilian production decreased, which also 
led to reduced Russian federal budget revenues and increased Russias national deficit.57  
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As depicted in Table 3.2, state defense orders dramatically fell over the course of 
one year from 1991 to 1992. 58 The rapid and deep cuts in military expenditure that 
followed the end of the cold war in which spending on equipment was often reduced to 
a greater extent than other forms of military expenditure created new pressures on 
(defense) industry to find new markets for its products.59  
 
Weapons Systems % Decrease 
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 55 
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs) 39 
Tactical missiles 81 
Surface-to-air missiles 80 
Air-to-air missiles 80 
Aircraft 80 
Tanks 97 
Field artillery 97 
Satellites and missile-delivery vehicles 34 
 
Table 3.2: Percentage Decreases in Russian Arms and Military Equipment (AME) 
State Procurement, 1991 to 1992 
 
From: Andrew Pierre and Dmitri Trenin, p. 14. 
 
 
The lack of government procurement orders was not strictly confined to the early 
1990s. This trend continued throughout the 1990s and still hinders the success of the 
Russian Federations defense industry today. In fact, according to Dr. Alexei Arbatov, 
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Vice Chairman of Russian Defence Committee, defense contractors should not expect 
significant domestic procurement to resume until 2005.60   
 
3. Challenges Facing Defense Conversion 
Faced with such downturns in state defense procurement orders, major reforms 
within the Russian defense industry were needed if the industry was to remain a viable 
sector of the Russian economy. Business and political leaders of the Russian Federation, 
therefore, attempted defense conversion to resurrect the defense industry. The conversion 
plan in its narrowest definition directed military equipment producing enterprises to 
convert to civilian goods. A more comprehensive definition was any transfer of 
assetspeople, technologies, capital, etc.from the defense sector to new uses in the 
civil economy.61  
Defense conversion within Russia, unfortunately, worked much better on paper 
than in reality and resulted in utter failure. Inherent difficulties present in the conversion 
of defense enterprises, misguided governmental strategy, and the staunch opposition of 
defense enterprise managers towards conversion were the primary challenges facing 
defense conversion in the Russian Federation.62  
 Converting defense enterprises into consumer oriented enterprises has been an 
immense challenge to leaders within the Russian defense sector. After decades of 
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answering to a single customer, i.e., the government, Russian defense enterprises were 
faced with the daunting challenge of answering numerous customers demands. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, the enterprises quickly understood they needed to 
efficiently convert their military-oriented production lines into civilian-oriented 
production lines if they were to remain in business.  Few, however, actually achieved 
success with defense conversion. Attempts by defense plants to initiate production of 
new products for civilian consumption experienced a meager 20 percent success rate 
during the 1990s.63 
The largest contributing factor to unsuccessful conversion is the Russian defense 
enterprises failure to adapt to the demands of the new consumer market. Russian 
defense enterprises traditionally orient themselves towards a supply-push approach to 
developing and manufacturing new products. However, most Russian firms must 
completely reorient themselves toward a demand-pull approach, in which product costs, 
specifications, and designs are determined by market demand.64 Additionally, when 
choosing a civilian product to manufacture, most defense enterprises place higher 
importance on what equipment and experience they have on hand instead of researching 
the consumer market to ascertain what type of consumer product is in demand.65  
Misguided government strategy is another major obstacle facing defense 
conversion in the Russian Federation. Many analysts believe the Russian governments 
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defense conversion strategy during the 1990s could have gone further than it did to 
salvage the once flourishing defense industry. After the failure of Gaydars shock 
therapy approach, the Russian government foolishly offered assistance in the form of 
subsidies to struggling enterprises within the defense sector. In effect, the government 
was rewarding those (defense enterprises) that had not taken any entrepreneurial 
risks.66  
The governments indecision regarding widespread unemployment in the defense 
sector was another blunder in strategy. The government wanted drastically to convert the 
defense industry, yet they did not want to cause widespread unemployment. Although 
(Viktor) Chernomyrdin has stressed the need for radical revamping of defense industries, 
customarily he quickly adds the caveat that workers should not lose their jobs as a 
result.67 Government leaders need to make the tough decision as to which of these two 
issues, conversion or unemployment, is more important because the future of the Russian 
defense industry remains in jeopardy.  
The staunch opposition of defense enterprise managers to convert their factories is 
another major challenge confronting the conversion of Russias defense industry. It is 
important to remember the majority of Russian defense enterprise managers were raised 
under the Soviet command-style economy, and, thus, are not readily adaptable to the 
conversion process. In the Soviet Union, defense managers tended to emphasize product 
performance and high technology at the expense of affordability and customer 
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satisfaction.68 They had one customer to satisfy, and if production problems did arise, 
the defense managers had the implicit knowledge that the government would never 
permit the enterprise to go bankrupt.69 
 The Russian defense managers received a rude awakening when the Soviet Union 
collapsed in 1991. Defense conversion began and the Russian managers were suddenly 
thrust into a new economy with little preparation. The managers had virtually no 
experience operating in market economies and they proved unable to competently assess 
market trends.70  The majority (of defense managers) continued to demonstrate a 
profound lack of faith in, and a serious misunderstanding of, the workings of a market 
economy.71 Instead of attempting to efficiently convert their enterprises,  many Russian 
defense managers staunchly opposed defense conversion. The Russian managers 
continued to look towards the state for assistance just as their Soviet counterparts had 
done. This lack of entrepreneurial spirit certainly does not bode well for the future of  
Russias defense industry.  
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B. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR RUSSIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
As a result of the disastrous conversion process and economic reforms throughout 
the 1990s, political and business leaders within the Russian Federation have begun to 
examine numerous initiatives which may alleviate some of the current problems  
confronting the defense sector. Newly elected  President Vladimir Putin is actively  
pursuing a restructuring of the defense sector. Russian leaders, likewise, continue to view 
the export of conventional weapons, and in particular, Military-Technical Cooperation 
(MTC) as a possible savior for its troubled defense industry.  
Russian military exports since 1991, as described in Chapter II, have become a 
key prerequisite for lessening the economic burden of military spending and ensuring the 
efficiency of defense industries as the core of Russias defense potential.72 The Russian 
defense sector, in other words, must attempt to continue attracting advanced conventional 
arms customers throughout the world in order to survive. 
 
1. Restructuring Under President Vladimir Putin 
Upon assuming office in 2000 President Vladimir Putin inherited numerous 
challenges within the Russian defense sector. In addition to declining defense 
procurement orders and difficulties with defense conversion,  bankruptcy and debt issues  
plagued the success of the Russian defense sector. President Putin aggressively enacted 
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restructuring measures within the defense sector to confront these challenges and 
resurrect the once thriving Russian defense industry, clearly understanding the  defense 
sectors vital role to the success of the Russian economy. President Putin states, It is the 
military industrial complex that can help Russia out of all the problems the country is 
facing. The government considers it (the defense industry) a priority sector of the Russian 
economy, and the sphere accumulating the most advanced technologies and highly skilled 
personnel.73 
Shortly after Vladimir Putin assumed office, grave reports surfaced regarding the 
state of the Russian defense industry. At the end of April 2000, Alexei Shulunov, First 
Vice President of the League for Assistance to Defense Sector Enterprises, announced 
more than 40 percent of Russian defense and industrial complex enterprises were on the 
verge of bankruptcy.74 A primary determinant behind such a substantial figure was the 
ever-increasing debt generated by state defense procurement orders. As of January 2000 
the total debt owed to Russian defense and industrial enterprises exceeded 33 billion 
rubles.75 As Alexei Shulunov points out, there was and continues to be a paradoxical 
situation currently enforced in Russias defense enterprises: the more state orders an 
enterprise gets, the worse off that enterprise is.76 Since the Russian Defense Ministry 
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cannot afford to pay defense enterprises for its conventional arms orders, the more orders 
a Russian defense enterprise receives from the Ministry, the larger that enterprises debt 
becomes. 
Vladimir Putin views restructuring as a necessary means to correct these problems 
and resurrect the Russian defense sector in the immediate future.  President Putin has  
begun his restructuring plan by creating the newly established Russian Conventional 
Weapons Agency, consolidating centers of conventional arms production, and  merging 
conventional arms export enterprises. One of the first steps Vladimir Putin took towards 
restructuring the defense industry took place in February 2000 when he approved  a 
statute creating the Russian Conventional Weapons Agency.77 The statute declared: 
The Russian Conventional Weapons Agency is a federal executive body 
which effects executive, control, licensing, regulatory and other functions. 
The Agency will operate in the sphere of the conventional arms industry, 
including research, development, production, modernization and 
utilization of armored vehicles, firearms and artillery systems, missile 
systems, high-precision weapons, cartridges for firearms, optic and 
electronic devices and systems for weapons and civil equipment.78 
 
The agency is envisioned as the sole governmental body responsible for supervising all 
state-owned enterprises of the conventional arms industry. President Putin projects that 
the creation of a central authority will facilitate the consolidation process and, thereby, 
                                                 
77 Putin Approves Statute of Conventional Weapons Agency, Moscow ITAR-TASS, FBIS Document 




enable profits from Russian conventional arms exports to increase over the next several 
years.  
 After creating the Russian Conventional Weapons Agency, Vladimir Putins next 
step in the restructuring process was the consolidation of  Russian conventional arms 
producing regions. Numerous Soviet/Russian cities and regions were created for the sole 
purpose of the defense industry. President Putin has sought to reduce the number of 
concentrated defense regions to four: St. Petersburg city; Moscow city; Moscow Oblast; 
and Chelyabinsk Oblast.79 By consolidating defense production centers, according to 
Vladimir Putin, it will now be possible to optimize budgeted means allocated for state 
defense orders, rule out duplication of production at different enterprises, and improve 
settlements within the defense-industrial complex.80  
The regional consolidation plan foresees cutting approximately two-thirds the 
number of current defense enterprises by 2005. Of the current 1,700 Russian defense 
enterprises, the  plan calls for an estimated 400500 to remain.81 As Vice-Prime Minister 
Ilya Klebanov succinctly stated, the consolidation of defense enterprises will allow the 
enterprises to be more competitive in the world (conventional) arms market.82 
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 Another option Vladimir Putin has considered since assuming office is the 
possible merger of the two leading Russian conventional arms exporters. 
Rosvooruzheniye and Promeksport defense enterprises, as discussed in Chapter II, are 
currently the top exporters of Russian conventional weapons. Vladimir Artyakov, Deputy 
General Director of Promeksport, stated the fierce competition between Rosvooruzheniye 
and Promeksport has made it difficult for progress to be made with Russian arms on the 
world market.83 Vladimir Putin concurs with such sentiments, and as of September 2000 
there was a presidential decree being prepared calling for Rosvooruzheniye to become the 
only Russian state mediator for the export of conventional weapons.84 In issuing such a 
decree, Vladimir Putin hopes the competitive nature of both enterprises will be funneled 
into a unified Russian effort to successfully compete against other countries in the 
worldwide conventional arms market.  
2. Military-Technical Cooperation (MTC) 
In addition to the restructuring efforts of President Putin, the Russian Federations 
defense sector has turned to the international conventional arms market for relief. Some 
analysts have pointedly stated, exports now equate to survival for many (Russian 
defense) firms.85 The continuing failure of the Russian economy has created a nearly 
irresistable attraction to the hard capital generated by the export of advanced 
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conventional weapon systems.86 MTC with other nations has become a key focus of 
both President Putin and Russian Federation defense industry leaders.  
 The concept of Russian MTC over the past decade includes several components. 
Most associate MTC strictly with conventional arms imports and/or exports and fail to 
recognize its other relevant aspects. MTC also includes the provision of military-
technical services, free or preferential aid, manufacturing licenses, and cooperation with 
other nations in the development of arms and military equipment.87  
 There are also several economic incentives associated with MTC to include 
increased hard currency proceeds, reduced domestic arms procurement costs, a sustained 
employment level within the defense sector, reductions in research and development 
costs, and possible creation of dual-use technologies.88 The proponents of arms exports 
and MTC advance arguments that range from arms sales usefulness as a means for 
financing enterprise conversion activities to their being a long-term source of revenue 
that should be cultivated in its own right.89 President Putins restructuring efforts merely 
strengthened such arguments. 
Russian defense enterprises frequently offer joint venture or licensed production 
packages to the customer with exports of conventional equipment. In doing so the 
recipients want to offset a substantial amount of their purchasing costs by establishing 
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their own domestic production lines, which allows them to develop expertise in a 
technologically advanced sector.90 Services such as these are additional tools employed 
by Russian defense enterprises to gain a greater market share of the international 
conventional arms market.  
In recent years Russian Military-Technical Cooperation with other countries has 
flourished. China and India, in particular, have entered into numerous MTC agreements 
with the Russian Federation. Both of these countries are looking to lower the costs of 
imported conventional arms, and, thus, they purchase licensed production rights to 
indigenously produce the equipment. Chinas purchase of the production license for the 
Su-27 fighter in 1996, as will be discussed in Chapter IV, and Indias  purchase of the 
production license for the Russian T-90 battletank are two recent MTC examples.91 In 
addition to conventional arms exports emanating from the Russian Federation, MTC 
agreements between Russia and other nations are rapidly becoming a major cause of 
concern for the United States since MTC agreements increase the number of Russian 
advanced conventional arms producers throughout the world. 
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Chapter III has provided a brief synopsis of the Russian Federations defense 
industry over the past decade. The defense sector experienced major challenges 
throughout the 1990s including lack of state defense procurement orders and the failure 
of defense conversion. Recently, however, drastic restructuring of the defense sector by 
President Putin and a newfound reliance on conventional weapons exports, including 
MTC, are  current initiatives being pursued by the Russian Federation. As these 
initiatives take effect, increased proliferation of Russias lethal conventional arms 













IV. CASE STUDY: RUSSIAN CONVENTIONAL ARMS EXPORTS 
TO  CHINA  
 
One of the most troubling aspects of Chinas military modernization 
program is its growing strategic partnership with Russia, which Beijing 
views as an offset to U.S. power. China continues to acquire sophisticated 
military equipment and technologies from Russia, including fighter 
aircraft, ships, submarines, cruise missiles, and surface-to-air missiles. 
Among the more troubling of Chinas recent acquisitions from Russia are 
two guided missile destroyers that will likely be outfitted with anti-ship 
cruise missiles specifically designed to counter U.S. carrier battle groups. 
Reportedly, China is seeking to purchase additional destroyers from 
Russia.92 
 
 Chapter IV explores present-day Russian conventional arms exports to China 
which serves as an example of a developing pattern of arms customer relationships 
between Russia and consumer nations. China has become one of Russias most profitable 
customers since Russia turned to aggressively exporting conventional arms to preserve its 
defense sector. Over the past decade, the Sino-Russian customer relationship has grown 
much closer than in previous decades and a strategic partnership is now emerging 
between the two nations to counter the perceived hegemony of the United States.  
The chapter examines the specifics of the strategic partnership, including a 
discussion of the types and quantities of conventional arms the Chinese are currently 
purchasing from Russia. The chapter also analyzes the potential threat the export of 
Russian conventional arms represents to operational forces of the United States Navy. 
Specifically, it will address the  threats to the U.S. Navy made possible  by the Peoples 
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Liberation Army Navys (PLAN) changing maritime strategy, as well as possible 
scenarios in which the PLAN and U.S. Navy may confront one another in the future.  
 
A. THE SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
 The Chinese and Russian Federation governments have developed a closer 
relationship with one another during the past decade to counter the perceived dominant 
influence of the United States. As a result, in lieu of an alliance, they have formed a 
strategic partnership. The strategic partnership is essentially a bilateral agreement and  
based on five key principles agreed upon by both the Russian Federation and China. 
Russian conventional arms procurement by the Chinese is one of the core elements of the 
newly emerging strategic partnership. China has been purchasing large volumes of 
Russian equipment and technology such as Mi-17 helicopters, Il-76 transport aircraft, Su-
27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, SA-10 and SA-15 SAM regiments, Kilo-class submarines, 
Sovremennyy-class destroyers with SS-N-22 Sunburn missiles,  and A-50 Airborne Early 
Warning (AEW) aircraft. 
1. Background of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership 
At the outset of the Cold War, Russia and China were communist allies, but 
during the 1960s, the two countries rapidly grew apart. Not only did the Soviet Union 
withdrew all Soviet advisers, aid, and weapon designs from China in 1960, the two 
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nations openly clashed along their common borders in the late 1960s.93 Over the next 
thirty years, China and the Soviet Union/Russia had little economic and diplomatic 
interaction with one another. 
1989 marked a major turning point in Sino-Soviet relations.  At the Sino-Soviet 
summit meeting in May 1989, a newfound cooperative relationship emerged between the 
Soviet Union and China with the two nations ultimately agreeing upon a framework of 
political rapprochement with one another.94 Military cooperation between the two 
nations including conventional arms sales and Military-Technical Cooperation  resumed, 
and the Chinese immediately began procuring Russian conventional arms to modernize 
their outdated military equipment.  Since the 1989 summit, ties between Russia and 
China  have gradually warmed, and the foundation for a long-term strategic partnership 
has  formed.95  
At the heart of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership are five principles adhered 
to by China and Russia: peaceful coexistence; mutual respect; trust; equality; and mutual 
non-interference in each other's affairs.96 China, for example, politically supports 
Russias current war against the Chechen rebels, and, similarly, Russia currently supports 
                                                 
93 Gill, Bates and Kim, Taeho, Chinas Arms Acquisitions From Abroad: A Quest for Superb and 
Secret Weapons. SIPRI Research Report No. 11, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 30. 
94 Ibid., p. 51. 
95 Eckholm, Erik, Russia, China Eye Friendship, New York Times News Service, January 14, 2001. 
96 Blank, Stephen J., Testimony Before The House Armed Services Committee, July 19, 2000. 
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Chinas policy of one-China.97  Each of the five guiding principles is equally important 
to both nations and by strictly adhering to the principles, the partnership between the 
Russian Federation and China only strengthens. In the words of Russian and Chinese 
leaders, the strategic partnership offers a model for the entire world as to how bilateral 
relationship among neighbors should develop.98  
The strategic partnership is not a formal alliance between the two countries. There 
has yet to appear, in fact, a formal clause binding either country to fight on behalf of the 
other, providing either country is attacked by a third party.99  Russia and China have also 
stated this partnership is not directed towards any specific third party, i.e. the United 
States.100 The partnership, though, increasingly seems to be evolving into an alliance 
type structure in order to combat U.S. influence in the Asian-Pacific region.  As Ian 
Anthony suggests, China and Russia hope that their bilateral military ties will provide 
them with a strategic counterweight to a number of threats and challenges in the post-cold 
war era, including U.S. hegemonism.101 The evolving Sino-Russian strategic 
relationship, therefore, requires close observation by the U.S. in the future.   
                                                 
97 Ibid. Note: In fact, Russia also supports a non-interference policy towards the Taiwan issue. Russia 
will not have state to state relations with Taiwan, will not sell weapons to Taiwan, and will not support 
Taiwanese membership in any world organization that requires statehood for membership. 
98 Ibid.  
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid.  
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2. Chinese Conventional Arms Purchases from Russia  
Export of Russian conventional arms to China is perhaps the most essential 
element of the emerging strategic relationship between the two countries. In the past 
decade, Chinas strong desire for Russian military equipment coincided with equally 
strong pressure by Russian arms manufacturers to sell their products to any and all 
interested parties.102 The Russian defense sector views the export of conventional 
weapons as crucial to their existence, and in their relationship with the Chinese they have 
found a customer willing to import large volumes of conventional arms.  
China embarked upon a modernization program for its armed forces, the Peoples 
Liberation Army (PLA), throughout the 1990s. The PLA is aware of the gap in 
capabilities between its military and other armed forces such as the United States and has 
recently initiated large-scale weapons procurement to diminish the gap.103 The PLA 
views the acquisitions of Russian conventional arms as a start to its modernization 
program. The Chinese are widely known for reverse-engineering military equipment so 
many analysts believe the recent purchases of Russian conventional arms are a short term 
solution for the PLAs outdated force. The longer term and more challenging solution to 
modernize the PLA is for the Chinese to successfully reverse-engineer the modern 1980s 
and 90s Russian equipment and technology in order to indigenously produce effective 
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conventional arms such as fighter aircraft and naval weapon systems.104 An increase of 
MTC agreements with Russia, as described in Chapter III, enables China to indigenously 
employ this technology in a much quicker fashion. All the more reason for the United 
States to maintain a close watch on the modernization efforts of the PLA. 
Chinas primary supplier of conventional arms over the last decade has been the 
Russian Federation. The Chinese enjoy access to and are able to afford the wide array of 
Russian advanced equipment offered for sale and have aggressively procured naval, air, 
and land conventional arms from the Russians. As depicted in Table 4.1, the PLA has 
purchased substantial quantities of Russian conventional equipment including Mi-17 
helicopters, Il-76 transport aircraft, SA-10 and SA-15 SAM regiments, and A-50 AEW 
aircraft.105  The Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), in particular, has dramatically 
boosted its maritime capabilities with the purchase of Kilo-class submarines and  
Sovremennyy-class destroyers armed with 3M-80 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) missiles. 
Additionally, the large volume purchases of fourth generation Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-
30MKK fighter aircraft will not only upgrade the PLAs Air Force (PLAAF), but these 
aircraft may also be employed in a naval support role to protect the PLANs warships.106  
The modernization program of the PLA is still in its infancy stage and continued  
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procurement of advanced Russian conventional arms will potentially threaten operational 
forces of the United States Navy in the Western Pacific. 
a. Kilo-Class Submarines 
Over the past decade, Chinas PLAN has sought to modernize its dated 
submarine fleet by procuring advanced diesel submarines. According to RADM Lowell 
E. Jacoby, Russia continued to produce a wide range of leading edge undersea warfare 
technologies for their own use and for export.107 It was only a matter of time before a 
deal was struck between the two countries regarding the sale of Kilo-class diesel  
submarines.  
Even though the PLAN currently has over one hundred submarines in its 
inventory, half of them are dated, non-operational, Romeo-class submarines.108 In the 
subsequent sales agreement between Russia and China in 1995, the PLAN procured four 
Kilo-class submarines from Russia at an estimated price of $700 million.109 The four 
Kilo-class submarines acquired by China consist of two Type 877EKM submarines and 
two advanced Type 636 submarines.110 The two Type 877EKM Kilos arrived in China in 
                                                 
107 RADM L.E. Jacoby, USN, Submarine Warfare in the 21st Century, Statement before the 
Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 13, 1999. 
108 Gill, Bates and Kim, Taeho, p. 62. 
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19, 1994. 
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February and November, 1995, and the Type 636 Kilos arrived in January and December 
of 1998.111  
 The four Kilo-class submarines greatly enhance the operational 
capabilities of the PLANs current submarine fleet. The two Type 877EKM Kilos 
purchased by China are the export variant of the basic Russian Kilo submarine 
complemented with improved fire-control systems and wire-guided acoustic homing 
torpedoes from two tubes.112  The two advanced Type 636 submarines have the added 
bonus of an improved propulsion system and acoustic quieting. The Type 636 is 
advertised as one of the quietest submarines in the world while maintaining the ability to 
operate up to 400 miles submerged and remain at sea for up to 45 days.113  
Recent reports suggest China is looking to purchase additional Kilo-class 
submarines from the Russian Federation in the near future. Two or three Kilo-class 
submarines equipped with the effective Russian 3M54 Club anti-ship cruise missile may 
be purchased within the next few years.114 Such acquisitions will serve to make the 
PLAN a more credible threat to the United States Navy in the Western Pacific. In the 
words of former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Chinas submarine fleet could 
constitute a substantial force capable of controlling sea lanes and mining approaches 
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around Taiwan, as well as a growing threat to submarines in the East and South China 
Seas.115 
b. Sovremennyy-Class Destroyers and SS-N-22 Sunburn Missiles 
Lacking an area on-board air defense and supersonic surface-to-surface 
missiles, China has recently purchased two Sovremennyy-class guided missile destroyers 
from the Russian Federation.116 The two destroyers are clearly the largest and most 
combat effective surface ships in the PLAN.  In order to acquire this increased capability, 
the Chinese reportedly paid approximately $1 billion to the Russian Federation for the 
two destroyers in November of 1997.117 The first destroyer, Hang Zhou, was delivered to 
China in February of 2000 and as of December, 2000, the second of the two destroyers, 
Fu Zhou, was in transit to China.118  
The design of the Sovremmennyy-class destroyer is fairly standard for a 
guided-missile destroyer. Equipment such as the medium-range Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly) 
surface-to-air missile and a complement of eight Ka-27 and Ka-28 anti-submarine 
helicopters have been included with the two destroyers.119 However, the devastating 
firepower of the Sovremennyy-class destroyers lies within its two quad launchers riding 
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port and starboard. Each quad launcher is capable of firing a four round salvo of 3M-80 
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) anti-ship missiles, making both units, the Hang Zhou and the 
Fu Zhou, lethal surface combatants.120 The initial deal calls for China to receive 
approximately 50 Sunburn missiles, with the first 24 having already arrived in the spring 
of 2000.121 
The SS-N-22 Sunburn missile is the most advanced surface-to-surface 
anti-ship cruise missile in the world. The Soviet Union, and now Russia, have always 
been known for their powerful surface-to-surface weapons and the Sunburn missile 
continues the tradition.  
The 3M-80 Moskit missile (SS-N-22 Sunburn) is powered by a 
solid rocket booster/ramjet sustainer combination delivering a 
maximum speed of Mach 2.1 at low altitude and a maximum range 
of up to 65 nautical miles depending on flight profile. The later 
3M-82 Moskit-M version is thought to extend range to about 81 
nautical miles. The weapons Altair-designed multichannel seeker 
uses active radar, anti-radiation, and home-on-jam modes. 
Approaching its target at an altitude of approximately 66 feet, 
Moskit can execute a terminal S maneuver (pulling up to 15g) to 
evade close-in defenses. The 660-pound penetrating warhead 
contains 330 pounds of high explosive. Raduga (the manufacturer) 
has publicized a number of further improvements to Moskit. These 
include more internal fuel (pushing range up to 108 nautical 
miles), an improved warhead and seeker updates.122 
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Chinas acquisition of the two Sovremennyy-class guided missile 
destroyers with the SS-N-22 Sunburn missiles clearly upgrades the capability of the 
PLANs surface fleet. It has been reported the PLAN is also looking to procure two more 
Sovremennyy-class destroyers from the Russian Federation in the near future. The 
Rastoropnyy and the Bezuprechnyy, both based at Severnaya Shipyard in St. Petersburg, 
are the most likely Sovremennyy-class destroyers to be purchased by China with delivery 
expected in the 2002-2003 timeframe.123 Chinas overall maritime capabilities will  
continue to improve in the foreseeable future. 
c. Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30MKK  Fighter Aircraft 
In addition to upgrading the PLANs undersea and surface capabilities 
with Russian conventional arms, China has also purchased advanced fourth-generation 
Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30MKK fighter aircraft from the Russian Federation. These long 
range fighters are vastly superior combat aircraft when compared to indigenously 
produced Chinese aircraft such as the  J-7,  J-8, or Q-5.124  Since 1996, China has 
received close to 50 Su-27 fighters at a cost of just under $2 billion and has also 
purchased the production license to indigenously produce up to 200 additional Su-27 
fighters at a cost of $2.5 billion.125 As for the Su-30MKK, China has reportedly 
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purchased 40 Su-30MKK from the Russian Federation at a cost of approximately $2 
billion and delivery is expected to begin as early as 2002 or 2003.126 
The Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30MKKs purchased by China are assigned to 
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF purchased these fourth generation fighters to 
improve their air-combat capabilities in the region. Even though the primary role of both 
long-range fighters is air-superiority,  PLA leaders envision a secondary naval support 
role for the fighters in the near future, especially the Su-30MKK.127 The United States 
Navy, consequently, may encounter fourth generation, Russian-designed fighter aircraft 
in the skies above the Western Pacific in the future.  
The Sukhoi Su-27 is a highly maneuverable and lethal fighter. Some 
analysts believe the Su-27  may be more maneuverable than the best Western fighters, 
and is roughly comparable to the United States F-15C air superiority fighter.128 
Russian armament such as the AA-10 Alamo and the helmet-sighted AA-11 Archer air-
to-air missiles give the Su-27 a formidable array of weapons to engage and defeat enemy 
aircraft. 
The Sukhoi Su-30MKK, arguably, is even more intimidating than the Su-
27. The Su-30MKK is an upgraded two-seat version of the Su-27 retaining much of the 
Su-27s air-combat capability, but is also equipped with all-weather navigation systems 
and laser or TV-guidance equipment that gives its precision-guided munitions pinpoint 
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accuracy.129 For the proposed naval support role, the Su-30MKK weapons loadout may 
include a variant of the powerful Russian and Chinese co-produced AS-17 Krypton air-
surface missile, and possibly the newly developed air launched version of the 3M-80 
Moskit (SS-N-22) anti-ship missile, the 3M-80EA.130 Evaluations are still ongoing for 
such weapon systems, but the United States needs to maintain a close watch on  air-
surface missile developments within China.  
 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES NAVY 
The large volume of advanced Russian conventional naval equipment exported to 
navies throughout the world carries serious implications for the United States Navy. 
During the Cold War, the United States Navy focused almost exclusively on the Soviet 
Navy. The United States Navy now, however, needs to maintain a much broader 
situational awareness of which countries possess such advanced Soviet/Russian naval 
equipment.  If the United States Navy fails to maintain this awareness, American 
warships, aircraft, and most importantly, lives could be lost in the future.  
Procurement of Russian naval equipment by Chinas PLAN, particularly, causes 
much concern for the operational forces of the United States Navy. The PLAN has 
recently altered their maritime strategy and they are seeking a much more influential role 
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in the seas of the Western Pacific. In the not too distant future, accordingly, the United 
States Navy may confront the PLANs Russian Kilo-class submarines and Sovremennyy-
class destroyers and depending on the scenario, the PLAN may have the advantage in 
such a confrontation. 
 
1. Changing Strategy of the PLAN 
The large volume of Russian advanced conventional arms imported by the PLAN 
during the last several years has supported a shift in Chinese maritime strategy. The 
PLANs once coastal-oriented, defensive naval strategy has subsequently evolved into an 
offshore-oriented, defensive naval strategy known as offshore active defense.131 As 
PLA General Liu Huaqing stated in 1993:  
It is imperative to establish a powerful and modern navy. The three main 
tasks of the peoples navy [PLAN] are to safeguard the motherlands 
sacred territorial waters, to counterattack hegemonists and advocates of 
power politics who play with fire and dare to invade our country, and to 
accomplish the great cause of the reunification of the motherland and 
smash all attempts to break China up by practicing Taiwan independence 
and one China, one Taiwan.132  
 
 
The focus of the PLANs new offshore active defense strategy is to control the 
seas out to the first and second island chains (see Figure 4.2). The first island chain 
includes those islands which run from the Kuril Islands north of Japan down through 
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Taiwan, the Philippines, and most of Indonesia, including the South China Sea.133 The 
second island chain includes the seas and islands out to Guam, the Marianas, and the 
Carolines.134 The PLAN, consequently, is looking to drastically increase their influence 
in the Western Pacific. 
The new strategy employed by the PLAN may seem ambitious. Boosted by the 
upgraded capabilities of the newly purchased Russian conventional equipment, however, 
some analysts believe the PLAN may control out to the first island chain by 2015 and the 
second island chain by 2030. Implications for the United States Navy operating in the 
Western Pacific will accordingly escalate in the future.  
 
2. Possible Scenarios Involving the United States Navy 
Ever-increasing tensions regarding Taiwans possible independence is the primary 
rationale why the United States Navy could conceivably confront the PLAN in the 
Western Pacific. If such a confrontation took place, a number of scenarios involving the 
United States Navy and the PLANs newly acquired Russian Sovremennyy-class 
destroyers and Kilo-class submarines could occur. The two primary scenarios which both 
focus on PLAN attacks against United States Navy surface combatants, include a no-
warning shot of an SS-N-22 from a Sovremennyy-class destroyer and a no-warning shot 
of a wake-homing torpedo from a Kilo-class submarine. 
                                                 




Figure 4.2: PLANs First and Second Island Chain Map 
After: Fisher, Richard D., Dangerous Moves: Russias Sale of Missile Destroyers to 





The no-warning shot, or first shot, of an SS-N-22 Sunburn missile from one of the 
PLANs Sovremennyy-class destroyers is arguably the most threatening scenario for 
surface combatants of the United States Navy. As Rear Admiral Eric McVadon stated in 
November 1999, the scariest scenario is the first shot theoryIf Beijing decided to take 
a potshot at a U.S. aircraft carrier, this missile (SS-N-22 Sunburn) would give us 
something to worry about.135 The United States Navy has reason for concern. 
According to Professor Igor Seleznyov, Director of the Raduga bureau and Program 
Head for the 3M-80 Moskit (SS-N-22) missile in 1993, the characteristics of the 3M-80 
Moskit missile have been optimized for the specific purpose of overcoming the 
defensive barrier of the United States Navys AEGIS system.136 
An SS-N-22 Sunburn missile fired in a first shot scenario from either the PLANs 
Fu Zhou or Hang Zhou Sovremennyy-class destroyers has an advantage against United 
States Navy warships. The only defense the United States Navy currently has against the 
missile is the Mk-15 CIWS Phalanx system and this system is hardly a guarantee against 
the SS-N-22.137 To counter the SS-N-22 Sunburn missile, the United States Navy has 
conducted several tests employing the Russian MA-31 supersonic cruise missile in a 
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simulated Sunburn missile role but has yet to successfully shoot one down.138 In a first 
shot scenario, consequently, ships equipped with an AEGIS system might not be able to 
guarantee 100 percent effectiveness in defending themselves against the missile, and 
ships not so equipped would be highly vulnerable to the missile unless they operate under 
the protective cover of an AEGIS-equipped ship.139 
The other threatening scenario for United States Navy surface combatants is a no-
warning shot of a wake-homing torpedo from one of the PLANs Russian Kilo-class 
submarines. When operating on battery power, the PLANs diesel Kilo-class submarines 
acquired from Russia are extremely quiet. The two improved Type 636 Kilos acquired by 
the PLAN are as quiet as an Improved Los Angeles (SSN-688) class nuclear-powered 
attack submarine (SSN) and more quiet than a basic Los-Angeles-class SSN.140 Such 
characteristics may enable the PLANs Kilo-class submarines to avoid U.S. Navy Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations and maneuver themselves into an optimal firing 
position to attack a U.S. Navy surface combatant with wake-homing torpedoes.  
The United States Navy has concerned itself with surface-ship torpedo defense for 
a number of years, but it does not currently possess a fully effective defense against a 
wake-homing torpedo. The only anti-torpedo defense currently employed by the U.S. 
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Navy includes evasive maneuvering and the use of towed acoustic decoys.141 As stated 
in CRS Report RL 30700: 
An attack by a wake-homing torpedo would pose a particular threat to a 
United States Navy ship for two reasons. First, the torpedoes are difficult 
to detect because they approach the ship from the rear where their sound is 
masked by the noise of the ships propellers. Second, a wake-homing 
torpedo would not be fooled by an acoustic decoy, and the ship may find it 
difficult to maneuver quickly enough to reduce or eliminate its wake. 
Given these considerations, U.S. Navy officials might not be able to 
guarantee 100 percent effectiveness in defeating an incoming torpedo. 
Some analysts, in fact, might argue that the chance of defeating a torpedo 
attack would be considerably less than 100 percent.142 
 
The combination of the improved, quiet Type 636 Kilo-class submarines and the 
highly effective wake-homing torpedo employed by the PLAN raises serious concerns for 
the United States Navy. If an unlocated  PLAN Kilo-class submarine positions itself for 
an attack against a United States Navy surface combatant, the fate of the surface ship is in 
the hands of the PLAN. Careful monitoring of the PLANs Kilo-class submarines and 
continued strong U.S. naval presence in the region, however, may prevent such a scenario 
from occurring in the first place. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
Chapter IV has examined the emerging Sino-Russian strategic partnership 
including the present cooperative customer relationship found between Russian 
                                                 




conventional arms exporters and Chinese conventional arms importers. The Russian 
defense industry views arms purchases by China as essential to their survival, whereas 
China views the purchases as necessary for their aggressive modernization efforts.  
 The Chinese have procured Russian conventional arms such as advanced Kilo-
class submarines, Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, and Sovremennyy-class destroyers 
armed with SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles. The PLANs newly emerging offshore-
oriented defense strategy has only been bolstered by such procurements. The United 
States Navy, accordingly, may find itself engaged against the PLAN in the future. If the 
United States neither maintains a strong presence in the Western Pacific nor devotes 
substantial resources to tracking the modernization efforts of the PLAN, such 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
63 
V. CONCLUSION  
A. OVERVIEW 
As the 21st century dawns, conventional arms producers proliferate billions of 
dollars of military equipment each year. Developed and developing countries continue to 
import and export large quantities of advanced conventional arms on a routine basis. 
While the quantity of conventional arms has fallen markedly since the height of the Cold 
War, the proliferation of increasingly advanced conventional arms utilizing modern 
technology raises serious concerns for the United States. 
The United States is especially concerned with the Russian Federations 
conventional arms transfer policies since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian 
Federation remains the second largest exporter of advanced conventional arms in the 
world. Russian conventional arms currently available include modern supersonic anti-
ship cruise missiles, acoustically quiet submarines, and advanced fourth generation 
fighter aircraft. Declining state procurement orders and lack of success in defense 
industry conversion have fueled the Russian Federations newfound reliance on exports 
of advanced conventional weapons to sustain the Russian defense industry. Exports of 
Russian conventional arms, accordingly, will continue to rise in the future.  
The transfer of Russian advanced conventional arms raises serious challenges for 
the United States Navy since many of these advanced weapons incorporate modern 
technologies designed to defeat current United States weapon systems. Russian 
conventional arms proliferation coupled with the emergence of Russian strategic 
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partnerships create serious implications for the United States Navy. China, for instance, is 
deliberately purchasing Russian advanced conventional naval arms to deny sea access to 
the United States Navy and its allies in the Western Pacific. According to RADM Rick 
Porterfield, Director of Naval Intelligence, many coastal countries (such as China) are 
developing - either by buying outright or by developing them indigenously - the military 
capabilities intended to deny the USA access to waters that are in the periphery of their 
nations.143 The United States government needs to take actions which will reduce this 
ever-increasing threat to United States naval forces in the Western Pacific. If the 
continued proliferation of Russian conventional arms goes unchecked or unmanaged, 
American warships, aircraft, and, most importantly, personnel will be at risk in the near 
future. 
 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Chapter II provided an overview of present day international and Russian 
conventional arms transfers. Although the volume of conventional weapons transfers 
dramatically decreased since the 1980s, billions of dollars continue to change hands in 
the worldwide conventional arms market on a yearly basis. While Russia still ranks as the 
number two exporter of conventional military arms in the world, market competition and 
a reliance on weapon sales for capital income has forced Russia to put their most 
                                                 
143 Koch, Andrew, Interview with RADM Rick Porterfield, DNI, Janes Defence Weekly, March 14, 
2001. 
65 
advanced weapons and modern technologies on the market. The United States, therefore, 
must continue to closely monitor both Russian export activity as well as the import 
activity of Russias worldwide customers.  
Chapter III analyzed the Russian Federations defense industry over the past 
decade when its defense sector experienced major challenges. Lack of state defense 
procurement orders for conventional arms and failure in converting defense enterprises 
are the two primary challenges confronting the Russian Federations defense industry. 
Recently, however, drastic restructuring of the defense sector by President Vladimir Putin 
and a newfound source of income through conventional weapons exports to include 
Military-Technical Cooperation (MTC) are initiatives which show promise. Russian 
defense enterprises now view the export of conventional arms as vital to their future 
existence. 
The case study in Chapter IV examined the emerging Sino-Russian strategic 
partnership.  The partnership illustrates the cooperative relationship developing between 
Russian conventional arms exporters, who view purchases by China as essential to their 
survival, and Chinese conventional arms importers, who view the Russian conventional 
arms imports as necessary for their modernization efforts. The Chinese Navy, in 
particular, procured large numbers of Russian conventional arms over the past decade 
such as highly-advanced Kilo-class submarines and Sovremennyy-class destroyers armed 
with SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles. The PLANs newly emerging offshore defense 
strategy has been enabled by such procurements. As the PLAN continues to improve their 
maritime capabilities, the United States Navy will increasingly encounter the PLANs 
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advanced, and potentially lethal, Russian-designed conventional naval equipment in the 
Western Pacific. Depending on the scenario, U.S. Navy surface ships may find 
themselves vulnerable to the modernized PLAN.  
 
C. U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
In light of the continuing transfer of advanced Russian conventional arms 
throughout the world, the United States government needs to initiate three policies to 
curtail proliferation and minimize the impact of these weapons on regional stability. 
While these proposals are not easily implemented, a lack of U.S. initiative may result in 
even greater security concerns for the United States Navy and its allies. First, the 
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods 
and Technologies arms control agreement must be  strengthened and closely monitored in 
order to prevent the Russian Federation from transferring certain conventional arms. 
Second, the United States needs to continue assisting the Russian Federation in their 
defense conversion efforts.  Lastly, to adequately address the recent modernization 
program of the PLAN and counter growing Chinese regional power projection 
capabilities, the United States Navy needs to maintain appropriate force levels in the 
Western Pacific.  
1. Strengthen the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) 
The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is the leading multilateral conventional arms control 
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agreement in the world today. The WA received final ratification by the original thirty-
three co-founding nations, including the United States and Russia, in July 1996.144 
Taking effect in September 1996, the arrangements objectives were to promote 
transparency, responsibility, and, where appropriate, restraint in the transfer of 
conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, particularly to 
countries and regions of concern such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. 145 
The WA, however, does not go far enough to prevent potential destabilizing arms 
transfers from taking place, such as in the current case of Russian sales to China. 
Currently, the decision to transfer conventional arms remains solely the responsibility of 
the individual member states. The WA does not require a case-by-case review of 
proposed arms exports by member states, nor does it have veto power on proposed 
exports.146  Even if some member countries have reservations regarding the arms transfer 
policies of a fellow member country, the exporting country in question can transfer the 
conventional weapons despite these reservations.147 
The United States should work to strengthen the WA to prevent future possible 
destabilizing arms transfers from taking place. Member countries of the WA need to be 
                                                 
144 Holum, John D., Senior Advisor for Arms Control and International Security, Testimony before 
the Senate Government Affairs Committee on the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Future of Multilateral 
Export Controls, April 12, 2000. Available online: <http://www.osce.usia.co.at/wassenaar/holum01.html>  
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145 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, November, 1997, p. 59.  
146 Holum, John D. 
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able to deny member countries the right to export conventional arms if a majority of the 
member states feel the transfers would destabilize a given region. Russian conventional 
arms transfers to China are a prime example. The United States and Chinas regional 
neighbors find the large volume of Russian conventional arms imported by the Chinese 
troubling, especially the import of the sophisticated and highly capable SS-N-22 Sunburn 
anti-ship missile. Presently, the most the United States can do under the WA is to 
formally voice their concerns about such transfers. A solution for this challenging issue is 
to create a WA amendment banning such sales if a majority of the member states agree 
the transfers would contribute to instability in a region. The United States needs to take 
the leading role in generating such an amendment.  
 
2. Continue United States-Russian Cooperation in Defense Conversion 
The United States needs to further initiate and promote cooperation with Russia to 
successfully convert former Russian defense enterprises into commercial, civilian-
oriented enterprises. As detailed in Chapter III, the Russian defense industry faces 
numerous challenges including declining state defense procurement and difficulties in 
defense enterprise conversion. A meaningful way for the United States to assist the 
Russians with their defense conversion efforts is to continue to urge U.S. firms, 
especially defense firms, to cooperate and share their expertise with Russian counterparts.  
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Such cooperation should be a continuation of the efforts initiated by the Nunn-
Lugar Program in 1994.148 In addition to helping with the dismantling of Russian nuclear 
weapons, the Nunn-Lugar Program includes funding for the conversion of Russian 
defense industries to civilian industries.149 The Fast Four project found within the Nunn-
Lugar Program, for example, has generated positive results in the past. Under the Fast 
Four project, approximately $20 million has been awarded to four projects that pair U.S. 
firms with Russian defense enterprises to create a new venture oriented toward 
production of goods and services for the Russian civil economy, including dental chairs, 
cola processing and bottling, hearing aids, and new air traffic control systems.150  
If American-Russian defense cooperation successfully continues over the next 
several years, two results will follow. First, ties between the United States and Russia 
will strengthen, contributing to greater trust between the two nations. Secondly, the fewer 
advanced conventional arms produced by the Russian Federation, the fewer advanced 
arms they have for export. Accordingly, the United States Navy will experience greater 
security in operational theaters throughout the world.  
3. U.S. Naval Force Requirements  in the Western Pacific 
The offshore defense, anti-access strategy emerging from Chinas PLAN 
necessitates a strong United States naval presence in the Western Pacific region for the 
                                                 




foreseeable future. The PLAN will continue to modernize by purchasing and developing 
advanced conventional arms. In determining future force requirements, Chinas recent 
and projected weapons acquisitions must be considered in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR) process to ensure United States Naval forces are able to shape and 
respond effectively to Chinese initiatives in the future. The 2001 QDR process should 
specifically examine the number of carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups, 
surface combatants, and attack submarines required to meet the potential challenge 
associated with the PLANs modernization program. 
The United States Navys Seventh Fleet is the symbol of American naval forward 
presence in the Western Pacific. The three primary missions of Seventh Fleet are: 
defend and protect the territory, citizens, commerce, sea lanes, allies and other vital 
interests of the United States; deter aggression with capable, flexible, and mobile U.S. 
naval forces, cooperating closely with other U.S. military services and the forces of allied 
and friendly nations; and, if deterrence fails, conduct prompt and sustained combat 
operations to terminate hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and allies.151 
Successfully conducting the three missions will become increasingly more 
challenging in the future due to the PLANs aggressive modernization program and 
developing strategy. Operational forces of the Seventh Fleet, therefore, must make a 
concerted effort to remain actively engaged with its allies in the Western Pacific to 
safeguard mutual interests over the next several years. Multinational naval exercises, 
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personnel exchanges, and other cooperative efforts with U.S. allies in the Western Pacific 
must continue at an aggressive pace. If Seventh Fleet reduces its regional engagement 
plan with allies and if appropriate force levels are not maintained, this inaction may lead 
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